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Abstract—Recently, with the rapid development of big data,
Internet of Things (IoT) brings more and more intelligent and
convenient services to people’s daily lives. Mobile healthcare
crowd sensing (MHCS), as a typical application of IoT, is
becoming an effective approach to provide various medical
and healthcare services to individual or organizations. However,
MHCS still have to face to different security challenges in
practice. For example, how to quickly and effectively authenticate
masses of bio-information uploaded by IoT terminals without
revealing the owners’ sensitive information. Therefore, we pro-
pose a large-scale concurrent data anonymous batch verification
scheme for MHCS based on an improved certificateless aggregate
signature. The proposed scheme can authenticate all sensing bio-
information at once in a privacy preserving way. The individual
data generated by different users can be verified in batch, while
the actual identity of participants is hidden. Moreover, assuming
the intractability of CDHP, our scheme is proved to be secure.
Finally, the performance evaluation shows that the proposed
scheme is suitable for MHCS, due to its high efficiency.
Index Terms—Mobile Healthcare Crowd Sensing, Aggregate
Signature, Batch Verification, Privacy Preservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
IOT, as a promising paradigm, can change the interactiveway between networks and the physical world [1]. Mean-
while, with the popularization and development of wireless
sensors, a new perceptual architecture - mobile crowd sensing
(MCS) [2], [3], has emerged. It provides a important technical
support for the integration of the physical world with higher
layer applications in IoT. As an important application branch
of MCS, mobile healthcare crowd sensing (MHCS) provides
more convenient medical and healthcare services for organi-
zations or individual.
Mobile healthcare crowd sensing (MHCS), combining the
merits of mobile crowd sensing with remote healthcare, is
becoming a research hotspot. On one hand, participants in
MCS upload health data collected by mobile terminals to cloud
server and enjoy various services by healthcare organizations.
On the other hand, remote healthcare system can provide
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Fig. 1: A simple architecture of the MHCS system
health information and medical service anytime and anywhere,
by analyzing the individual health data and patient vital signs
submitted to remote health apps installed in mobile terminals
or monitoring devices. Therefore, MHCS can not only provide
real-time medical services to individual or community, but
also improve the ability of healthcare organizations to monitor,
track and control certain diseases on some regions.
However, there are still many security threats and privacy is-
sues in MHCS: a) the collected health data may deduce users’
sensitive information, such as identity, personal activities and
health status; b) the data may be obtained or changed by an
opponent, which will bring damage to people’s health and
property, even people’s lives; c) these data collected by mobile
devices should be processed safely in a real-time manner,
otherwise the quality of medical service will be reduced.
Therefore, the security and privacy preservation for MHCS is
need to be considered emergently. So, more and more privacy-
preserving schemes [4]–[20] have been proposed in recent
years. In this work, we also mainly focus on the privacy
preservation for MHCS.
According to [5], a simple architecture of the MHCS
system consists of MHCS participants, a cloud sever, and
healthcare organizations. In MHCS, as shown in Fig. 1, the
cloud sever publishes sensing task for specific purpose. The
2participants receive a sensing task published from cloud sever,
then they collect and upload the relevant health data to the
sever. Meanwhile, the cloud sever will deliver the requested
information to specific organizations or healthcare institutes so
as to make further analysis. However, millions of participants
submit numerous biomedical data to the cloud sever, which
will lead to data transmission obstacles and storage capacity
burdens. An efficient approach named aggregate signature
(AS) can improve the efficiency of the verification on nu-
merous signatures and reduce the overhead of storage and
bandwidth. The first AS scheme based on traditional public
key cryptography was proposed by Boneh et al. [6] in 2003.
It allowed multiple users to generate the signatures on different
messages respectively and verify them in batch.
Following Boneh’s work, many AS schemes were proposed
subsequently, but most of them were involved in the com-
plicated certificate management problem. Thus, certificateless
public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) appeared to solve this
issue. In 2007, Castro and Dahab [21] first introduced the
concept of certificateless aggregate signature (CL-AS) that
combined the merits of aggregate signature with CL-PKC.
Then, Gong et al. raised the formal security model for CL-
AS in [22] in the same year. After the initial work, lots of
CL-AS have been proposed [23]–[26].
In this paper, we put forward a large-scale concurrent data
anonymous batch verification scheme for MHCS. The main
work of this paper are summarized as follows:
• The proposed scheme can provide bio-information batch
verification and anonymous authentication for MHCS
systems.
• Based on the hardness of the Computational Diffie-
Hellman Problem (CDHP), it is formally proved that our
scheme is secure against the existential forgery attack on
adaptively chosen message.
• In the quantitative performance evaluation, our scheme
achieves less computation overhead compared with the
previous schemes. It is very suitable for the MHCS
systems in practice.
The rest part of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we
introduce the reference model, security model and design goals
in Section II. In Section III, we improve a CL-AS scheme with
the security proof. In Section IV, we describe the the large-
scale concurrent data anonymous batch verification scheme in
detail. In Section V, we analyze the performance. Finally, we
conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. MODELS AND DESIGN GOALS
For a better understanding, we first put forward the relevant
models for MHCS, and then raise design goals.
A. Reference Model
The reference model for MHCS scenarios consists of four
entities: Requestor, Data Center (DC), Management Server
(MS), and MHCS Participants, as shown in Fig.2.
• Requestor: The requestors can submit healthcare sensing
tasks to DC for some specific purposes. And they can
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Fig. 2: The reference model for MHCS systems
further analyze the final report from DC to predict certain
medical or health issues in some regions.
• Data Center (DC): It can publish and manage healthcare
sensing tasks according to the demands of the requestors.
Also, it is responsible for aggregating and verifying all
collected health data from different participants.
• Management Server (MS): MS is a trusted third party
who can manage the participants’ registration information
in MHCS systems. It is in charge of issuing the a half
private keys for legitimate participants and distributes the
index of the participants to cover their actual identity.
Here, DC can use the index to authenticate the uploaded
health data from the participants.
• MHCS Participants: MHCS Participants refer to the
mobile clients who collect and submit relevant health data
using smart terminals for Data Center (DC).
B. Security Model
As security issues studied in [27]–[30], design of multi-party
mobile computing scheme requires extra caution on security
and privacy issue. To make better security analysis, we refer
to the security model defined in [31], in which there are two
types of opponents who are able (or unable) to replace certain
participants’ public key without (or with) the management
server’s private key. In this model, it can be proved that our
scheme is secure against the above two kinds of opponents, if
the following computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP)
is intractable. Here, we give the definition of the CDHP: in a
large prime order q cycle additive group Ga, ∀xP, yP with a
generator P and unknown x, y ∈ Z∗q , get xyP finally.
C. Design Goals
Our design goals aim at designing a large-scale concurrent
data anonymous batch verification scheme for MHCS, which
achieves following properties:
• Batch authentication: The authentication information in
the signed bio-data from large-scale MHCS participants
could be aggregated and verified effectively by DC.
3TABLE I: Notations
Ga a cyclic additive group of order q P a generator of Ga
Gm a cyclic multiplicative group of order q e(·) a bilinear map: Ga ×Ga → Gm
σi digital signature of the participant with IDi mi healthcare data of the participant with IDi
σ aggregate signature Ai An adversary on type i
QDC DC’s public key sDC DC’s private key
QMS MS’s public key sMS MS’s private key
〈Q1i, Q2i〉 the public key of the participant with IDi 〈s1i, S2i〉 the private key of the participant with IDi
l system security parameter q a large prime number
H1(·) a hash function: {0, 1}
∗ ×Ga → Ga H2(·) a hash function: {0, 1}
∗ ×Ga → Z∗q
• Non-repudiation: MHCS participants cannot deny that
they have submitted the related health data to DC.
• Anonymity: Although DC can acquire and check the
aggregated authentication message, it cannot obtain the
real identity of the data provider.
III. AN IMPROVED CL-AS SCHEME
Key management is essential for security [32]–[34].To pro-
vide a cryptographic essential for our design goals, we pri-
marily propose an improved CL-AS scheme and then give the
relevant security proof in this section. It can not only be used to
realize batch verification, but also can deal with the key escrow
problem of identity-based public key cryptosystem (ID-PKC)
[35]. Due to these merits, it could be the key to designing
a large-scale concurrent data anonymous batch verification
scheme for mobile healthcare crowd sensing systems. Before
describing the new certificateless aggregate signature scheme,
we first introduce the concept of bilinear pairing.
A. Bilinear Pairing
A bilinear pairing map, formally defined as e : Ga×Ga →
Gm, should satisfy the following three properties, in which
Ga is a additive group, Gm is a multiplicative group, q is the
order, P is the generator of Ga.
• Bilinear: ∀L,M,N ∈ Ga, e(L,M +N) = e(L,M)e(L,
N) or ∀x, y ∈ Z∗q , e(xM, yN) = e(M,N)
xy = e(xyM,
N) = e(M,xyN);
• Non-degenerate: ∃M,N ∈ Ga, satisfy e(M,N) 6= g.
Here, g is the generator of Gm;
• Computable: e(·, ·) should be efficient, ∀M,N ∈ Ga.
B. Design of the new CL-AS Scheme
In this part, the detailed CL-AS scheme is constructed. We
give the specification on Setup, Set-Partial-Key, Signing, Veri-
fication, Aggregation, and Aggregate Verification, described as
follows:
1) Setup: Key Generation Center (KGC) initializes and
establishes the system as follows:
a. Construct two cyclic groups (Ga,+) and (Gm, ·)
with additive operation and multiplicative operation
respectively. Their order is a secure large prime
q meeting a security parameter l. Set a pairing
operator, e : Ga × Ga → Gm that satisfies the
properties described above. Then, select two secure
hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗
× Ga → Ga and
H2 : {0, 1}
∗ ×Ga → Z
∗
q .
b. Key Generation Center (KGC) picks a random num-
ber sKGC ∈ Z
∗
q for QKGC = sKGCP . Here,
〈sKGC , QKGC〉 is its private/public key pair. Then,
KGC publishes 〈l, q, P,Ga, Gm, e,H1, H2, QKGC〉
as the system parameters, while store sKGC as its
private key secretly.
2) Set-Partial-Key: It consists of two part algorithms, one
is to generate the partial key by a client or a signer, the
other one is to compute the partial key by the KGC.
a. A client or a signer, marked as Ci, obtains his or
her partial secret key by choosing s1i ∈ Z
∗
q randomly
and the partial public key by computingQ1i = s1iP .
b. Ci sends his/her idi to KGC and request the partial
key for the identity idi. KGC calculates Q2i =
H1(idi, Q1i), S2i = sKGCQ2i for it and distributes
the half private key to Ci through secure channels.
Hence, Ci can obtain the public key 〈Q1i, Q2i〉 and
the private key 〈s1i, S2i〉. Note that, each identity
only can be used once.
3) Signing: The signer chooses ki ∈ Z
∗
q randomly and then
sign a message mi, as follows:
Vi = kiQ1i
hi = H2(mi, Vi)
Ui = S2i + kihis1iQKGC
(1)
Then, the signer view the pair σi = 〈Vi, Ui〉 as the
signature on mi.
4) Verification: To ensure the validity of the signature σi
signed by a Ci on the message mi, the verification
procedure is as follows:
Q2i = H1(idi, Q1i)
hi = H2(mi, Vi)
e(Ui, P ) = e(Q2i + hiVi, QKGC)
(2)
Obviously, if the above equations hold, the signature is
4valid. Additionally, the proposed scheme also satisfies
correctness:
e(Ui, P ) = e(S2i + kihis1iQKGC , P )
= e(S2i, P )e(kihis1iQKGC , P )
= e(sKGCQ2i, P )e(kihis1iP,QKGC)
= e(Q2i, sKGCP )e(kihiQ1i, QKGC)
= e(Q2i, QKGC)e(hiVi, QKGC)
= e(Q2i + hiVi, QKGC)
5) Aggregation: To obtain the final signature from all σi of
the messagemi, the aggregator computes in the following
way:
U =
n∑
i=1
Ui
V =
n∑
i=1
hiVi
Q2 =
n∑
i=1
Q2i
(3)
The σ = 〈U, V 〉 is the final aggregated signature.
6) Aggregate Verification: On receiving an aggregate sig-
nature σ for aggregating Ci (from i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
and the public key QKGC , the verifier will authenticate
the aggregate signature. And the signature σ can be
authenticated correctly, if the integrated formula holds:
e(U, P ) = e(Q2+V,QKGC). Here, we give the proof of
the equation on its correctness as follows:
e(U, P ) = e(
n∑
i=1
Ui, P )
=
n∏
i=1
e(Ui, P )
=
n∏
i=1
e(S2i + kihis1iQKGC , P )
=
n∏
i=1
e(S2i, P )e(kihis1iQKGC , P )
= e(Q2, QKGC)e(V,QKGC)
= e(Q2 + V,QKGC)
C. Security Proof
To make it convincing, it is proved that the proposed CL-AS
scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen
message attacks in the random oracle model if the CDHP is
intractable. As described in section II, two types adversary,
named A1 and A2 who attempt to forge a legal signature
with different abilities (able/unable to use the PKC’s private
key). We will prove the security of the proposed CL-AS under
A1 and A2’s attacks respectively. The detailed proofs are as
follows:
Theorem 1. If the adversary A1 could break the proposed
scheme by making q1/2 queries to H1/2, qk queries to Extract-
Queries, qs queries to Secret-Key-Queries, qp queries to
Public-Key-Queries, qr queries to Replace-Public-Key queries,
and qsig to CLAS-Sign-Queries, so CDHP could be solved
within:
t+ (q1 + q2 + qk + qs + qp + qr + qsig)tm
with probability:
ε′ ≥
1
(qk + 1)e
ε
Proof. Let C be a challenger trying to solve a CDHP
instance (P, aP, bP ) in Ga. For a, b ∈ Z
∗
q , we set X = aP
and Y = bP . X,Y ∈ Ga is a CDHP instance in Ga. A1
interacts with C as the model in [24]. C sets QKGC = X .
Suppose A1 is a PPT Turing machine taking only open
data as input,who has a advantage to break the proposed
CLAS scheme with non-negligible probability. Given two
random oracles which are H1 and H2 respectively, C gives the
parameters 〈l, q, P,Ga, Gm, e,H1, H2, QKGC〉 to A1. C tries
to simulate all above oracles to obtain the valid signatures of
any messagemi as the real signer. List L = 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉
is maintained by C. Throughout the proof process, ⊥ means
the value of a variable is invalid. In particularly, A1 can query
as follows:
• H1-Queries: On receiving a query Ii = 〈idi, Q1i〉 on H1
from A1, with a list of tuple 〈Ii, ci, αi, Q2i〉, called Lc,
C can simulate oracle H1 as follows:
- If Ii already exists in Lc, C outputs related Q2i.
- Otherwise, C sets ci = 0 with probability λ and ci =
1 with probability (1 − λ). If ci = 0, C chooses
αi ∈ Z
∗
q and outputs Q2i = bαiP ∈ Ga. If ci = 1,
then Q2i = αiP . In both cases, C inserts a tuple
〈Ii, ci, αi, Q2i〉 to Lc.
• H2-Queries: C simulates H2 by maintaining a list Lv
with 〈Ji, hi〉. Here, Ji = 〈mi, Vi〉, mi ∈ {0, 1}
∗
and
Vi ∈ Ga. On inputting Ji to H2, C does as follows:
- If Ji already exists in Lv, C outputs the same answer.
- Otherwise, C chooses hi ∈ Z
∗
q and inserts a tuple
〈Ji, hi〉 to Lv. Finally, it outputs hi as the answer.
• Extract-Queries: A1 makes the query on 〈idi, Q1i〉.
- Firstly, C recovers the corresponding 〈Ii, ci, αi, Q2i〉
from the list Lc. If ci = 0, C returns failure. If
ci = 1 and L contains 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉, C checks
if S2i =⊥.
- If S2i 6=⊥, C returns the current S2i to A1. Other-
wise, H1(idi, Q1i) is set as αiP . C computes S2i =
αiQKGC , then C inserts a tuple 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉
to the list L and outputs S2i as the answer.
- Again, if ci = 1, the list L does not contain
〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉. Then, C sets S2i =⊥ and com-
putes S2i = αiQKGC . Finally, C inserts a tuple
〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 to L and replies S2i as output.
• Public-Key-Queries: A1 makes the query on an identity
idi.
- If 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 is in L, C checks if Q1i =⊥. If
holds, C selects s1i ∈ Z
∗
q and Q1i = s1iP . It updates
〈Q1i, s1i〉 to L and replies Q1i to A1. Otherwise, C
returns Q1i to A1.
- If 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 is not in L, let S2i =⊥, then
selects a random s1i ∈ Z
∗
q and sets Q1i = s1iP .
C inserts a tuple 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 to L and replies
Q1i to A1.
• Secret-Key-Queries: A1 makes the query on an identity
idi.
5- If 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 is in L, C checks if s1i =⊥. If
holds, C selects a random s1i ∈ Z
∗
q . It also returns
s1i and adds tuple 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 to the list L.
Otherwise, s1i 6=⊥, C replies s1i to A1.
- If 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 is not in L, C sets s1i =⊥ and
replies a random s1i ∈ Z
∗
q to A1.
• Replace-Public-Key queries: A1 chooses new public
key Q′1i for an identity idi.
- If 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 is in L, C sets Q1i = Q
′
1i and
s1i =⊥. It updates a tuple 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 to the
list L.
- If 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 is not in L, C sets Q1i = Q
′
1i
and s1i =⊥, then it inserts a tuple 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉
to the list L.
• CLAS-Sign-Queries: In this queries, C provides valid
signatures of any message mi of idi with list L =
〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉, Lc = 〈Ii, ci, αi, Q2i〉, Lv = 〈Ji, hi〉,
and answers the query as follows:
- If L is not empty and ci = 1, C checks if s1i =⊥.
If s1i =⊥, C makes Public-Key-Queries to generate
s1i and Q1i = s1iP .
- If L is empty, C makes Public-Key-Queries to
generate s1i and Q1i = s1iP and adds them to list
L.
- C tries to generate the signature. If ci = 1, C returns
failure. Otherwise, C picks a random ki ∈ Z
∗
q , and
computes
Vi = kiQ1i
hi = H2(mi, Vi)
Ui = S2i + kihis1iQKGC
(4)
- Output σi = 〈Ui, Vi〉 as the signature on mi.
It is easy to verify σi via the above equation, so the
simulation is perfect. If C does not abort this game, none
can distinguish the simulation from a legal signer.
Eventually, with nonnegligible probability, C obtains two
valid signatures σi = 〈Ui, Vi〉 and σ
′
i = 〈U
′
i , Vi〉 with help of
A1, where Ui 6= U
′
i . Then, we C the following two equations:
Ui = S2i + kihis1iQKGC (5)
U ′i = S2i + kih
′
is1iQKGC (6)
Multiplying both side of equation (5) with (hi)
−1 and both
side of equation (6) with (h′i)
−1, we can obtain (7) and (8)
(hi)
−1Ui = (hi)
−1S2i + (hi)
−1hikis1iQKGC (7)
(h′i)
−1U ′i = (h
′
i)
−1S2i + (h
′
i)
−1h′ikis1iQKGC (8)
Subtract (8) from (7)
(h′i)
−1U ′i − (hi)
−1Ui = [(h
′
i)
−1 − (hi)
−1]S2i (9)
Then, C obtains 〈idi, s1i, S2i, Q1i〉 in L and 〈Ii, ci, αi, Q2i〉
in Lc, respectively. If ci = 1, C aborts. Otherwise, if ci = 0,
Q2i = αibP , now QKGC = aP = sKGCP . Because of S2i =
aQ2i = aαibP , we can obtain (10) and (11) as follows:
(h′i)
−1U ′i − (hi)
−1Ui = [(h
′
i)
−1 − (hi)
−1]abαiP (10)
abP = [(h′i)
−1U ′i − (hi)
−1Ui][((h
′
i)
−1 − (hi)
−1)αi]
−1 (11)
Therefore, C finds abP as the solution to CDHP and solves
CDHP with the probability
ε′ ≥
1
(qk + 1)e
ε
There are three events needed by C to succeed: E1 is the
result of any Extract-Queries raised by A1 does not abort. E2
represents A1 generates a valid signature that can be verified.
E3 represents the probability that A1 outputs a valid forgery
and C does not leave the game. The probability of C success
is that all the three events mentioned above happen:
P [E1 ∧E2 ∧ E3] = P [E1]P [E2|E1]P [E3|E2 ∧E1]
.
• Claim 1: The probability of E1 happening is at least (1−
λ)qk , because P [ci = 1] = (1−λ) and it takes at leat qk
queries. So, P [E1] ≥ (1− λ)
qs .
• Claim 2: The Probability that E2|E1 happens is at least
ε. So P [E2|E1] ≥ ε
• Claim 3: The probability that E3|E2 ∧ E1 happens is at
least λ, because P [ci = 0] = λ, and E1|E2 both happen.
So P [E3|E2 ∧ E1] ≥ λ
Therefore, we can conclude that the probability of all three
events happening is as follows:
P [E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3] = P [E1]P [E2|E1]P [E3|E2]
= λ(1 − λ)qkε
We suppose λ = 1(qk+1) . Then,
ε′ ≥ λ(1 − λ)qkε
ε′ ≥
1
(qk + 1)
[1− frac1(qk + 1)]
qkε
If qk is sufficiently large, [1 −
1
qk+1
]qk tends to 1e . So, the
final probability is as follows:
ε′ ≥
1
(qk + 1)e
ε
A forged aggregate signature could be generated in the
following way by C:
U =
n∑
i=1
Ui
V =
n∑
i=1
hiVi
(12)
Theorem 2. The proposed CL-AS scheme is existentially
unforgeable against the second kind of adversaryA2 assuming
the CDHP is hard.
Proof. This security property also relies on the hardness of
CDHP. Assuming the CDHP is intractable, we can prove that
6our scheme is secure in the similar way in Theorem 1. Thus,
we omit the proof in detail.
IV. A LARGE-SCALE CONCURRENT DATA ANONYMOUS
BATCH VERIFICATION SCHEME FOR MHCS
Due to the unique security requirements of mobile health-
care crowd sensing, we design an anonymous batch verifi-
cation scheme for large-scale concurrent data. It can provide
privacy-preserving batch verification of the uploaded health
data in MHCS and achieve multi-user access authentication.
A. Scheme Description
The proposed scheme consists of five algorithms, such as:
Initialization, Registration, Signing, Anonymous Aggregation,
and Batch Verification. Here, we list some notations in Table I
to facilitate our understanding. Then, we give the assumption
of the time synchronization between the requested DC and
MHCS participants. The proposed scheme is introduced as
follows:
1) Initialization. MS establishes an enrollment system as
follows:
a. MS define Ga as a additive group, Gm as a multi-
plicative group, q as the order, P as the generator
of Ga, e : Ga ×Ga → Gm as a bilinear map, H1 :
{0, 1}∗ × Ga → Ga and H2 : {0, 1}
∗ × Ga → Z
∗
q
as two secure hash functions.
b. Given l, MS selects its private key sMS ran-
domly and calculates its public key QMS =
sMSP . Then, it opens the system parameters
〈l, q, P,Ga, Gm, e,H1, H2, QMS〉. We suppose that
DC regards 〈sDC , QDC〉 as its long-term key pair,
where QDC = sDCP .
2) Registration. A participant and the MS perform the fol-
lowing steps to access a DC as follows:
a. The participant, marked as Ci, chooses a random
number s1i ∈ Z
∗
q as the half private key, and it
obtains S2i from MS who computes S2i = sMSQ2i,
where Q2i = H1(idi, Q1i) as the other half part
private key. Ci sets 〈s1i, S2i〉 as its private key. Then,
it sends 〈idi, Q1i〉 to MS.
b. Upon receiving 〈idi, Q1i〉, MS chooses a random
number ai ∈ Z
∗
q and calculates
Q2i = H1(idi, Q1i)
S2i = sMSQ2i
indexsi = aiS2i
indexvi = aiQ2i
(13)
Thus, MS stores serial number sni = 〈idi, Q1i, Q2i,
indexsi, indexvi〉. Then, it sends SNi = indexvi
and indexsi to the participant with idi. All of the
registration information should be transmitted via a
secure channel.
Participants DC
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Fig. 3: The flowchart of the concurrent data anonymous
batch verification scheme
3) Signing. Ci chooses a random number ki ∈ Z
∗
q and a
time stamp ti, where ti is the system time to maintain
the freshness of the message, and calculates
Vi = kiQ1i
hi = H2(mi||ti, Vi)
Ui = indexsi + kihis1iQMS
SN ′i = EQDC (SNi||hi||ti)
(14)
Each required sensing data could be verified by
e(Ui, P ) = e(indexvi + hiVi, QMS) (15)
respectively. Then, Ci uploads 〈Ui, Vi,mi, SN
′
i〉 to DC
who issues the sensing task. Additionally, we can easily
prove the correctness of the equation (15) as follows:
e(Ui, P ) = e(indexsi + kihis1iQMS , P )
= e(indexsi, P )e(kihis1iQMS , P )
= e(aiS2i, P )e(kihis1iP,QMS)
= e(aisMSQ2i, P )e(kihiQ1i, QMS)
= e(indexvi, QMS)e(hiVi, QMS)
= e(indexvi + hiVi, QMS)
4) Anonymous Aggregation. DC plays a role of the aggre-
gator to merge all collected authentication information
of different participants to a single verification mes-
sage. Upon receiving 〈Ui, Vi,mi, SN
′
i〉, DC calculates
DsDC (SN
′
i) = SNi||hi||ti. For an aggregate set of
n participants C1, C2, ......, Cn and a set of signatures
〈Ui, hiVi〉, when the time T is up, DC aggregates all the
received signatures as follows:
U =
n∑
i=1
Ui
V =
n∑
i=1
hiVi
indexv =
n∑
i=1
indexvi
(16)
7Then, DC treats σ = 〈U, V, indexv〉 on all health data
〈m1,m2, . . . , mn〉 as the aggregated authentication mes-
sage.
5) Batch Verification. As illustrated in Fig. 3, DC verifies
the validity of e(U, P ) = e(indexv + V,QMS). If the
equation holds, DC approves all health data uploaded
by participants within the time slot T as legal data.
Otherwise, DC aborts this procedure. Here, DC can verify
the validity of the equation as follows:
e(U, P ) = e(
n∑
i=1
Ui, P )
=
n∏
i=1
e(Ui, P )
=
n∏
i=1
e(indexsi + kihis1iQMS , P )
=
n∏
i=1
e(indexsi, P )e(kihis1iQMS , P )
= e(indexv, QMS)e(V,QMS)
= e(indexv + V,QMS)
B. Security Analysis
For convincing, we analyze the security of the large-scale
concurrent data anonymous batch verification scheme in this
part.
Theorem 3. The proposed scheme satisfies batch authenti-
cation, non-repudiation, and anonymity.
Proof. We will give the proof as follows:
1) Batch authentication: The proposed scheme is secure
due to the intractability of the CDHP. So DC can authenticate
the identities of MHCS participants by their signatures on
health data. Meanwhile, it can aggregate all signatures from
large-scale participants to a single verification message and
verify the message by checking e(U, P ) = e(indexv +
V,QMS). Thus, our scheme can achieve anonymous batch
verification.
2) Non-repudiation: In our scheme, MHCS participant
cannot deny that he/she has submitted the health data. DC
can verify his/her signature via the corresponding public key.
Then, MS can find serial number sni according to the public
key and obtain the real identity of the participant.
3) Anonymity: In the phase of aggregate verification, due
to the distribution of SNi is random, DC cannot get the real
identity of the MHCS participant from SNi. Therefore, even
if the opponent has unlimited computing power, it is unable to
guess the actual participant’s identity with the nonnegligible
advantage. Thus, the proposed scheme achieves anonymity.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATE
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme in two aspects, including computation overhead and
storage overhead. Firstly, comparing our scheme with other
three existing schemes, we assess the performance of the
computation overhead in terms of the computation complexity
and time overhead on signing, anonymous aggregation and
batch verification. Then, we analyze the storage overhead of
the proposed scheme.
A. Computation Overhead
1) Computation Complexity: We select three existing
schemes [23], [24], [36] to compare the computation com-
plexity with our scheme. Due to the computation overhead is
mostly caused by three basic cryptographic operations, so we
mainly focus on the time consumption of these operations.
Here, we only count on computation consumption, while the
pre-computation efforts are omitted. We define P as a pairing
operation, S as a scalar multiplication in Ga and H as hash
functions.
Table II shows the complexity comparison between different
schemes. We find that, in the signing stage, our scheme only
requires nH + 2nS operations, while the schemes in [23],
[24], [36] require 4nH + 3nS, nH + 4nS and nH + 3nS
respectively. In the verification stage, our scheme needs
2nH +2nP + nS operations, rather than 5nH +4nP +2nS
in [23], 2nH+3nP +3nS in [24] and 2nH+3nP +2nS in
[36]. In addition, in aggregation stage, only our scheme needs
2nS scalar multiplications, but it only requires two pairing
operations in aggregate verification stage. Hence, compared
with the schemes in [23], [24], [36], our scheme has the
least total computation overhead in all four stages – signing,
verification, aggregation and aggregate verification.
Meanwhile, Fig. 4 shows the comparison of computation
cost between different schemes. And we also find that our
scheme has lowest computation complexity than the other
schemes [23], [24], [36], with the increasing of the number
of participants. As a whole, our scheme achieve the best
performance of the computation complexity.
2) Time Overhead: In order to evaluate and test the per-
formance of time overhead on our scheme, we compare
our scheme with other three schemes [23], [24], [36]. For
quantitative analysis, we first construct a simulation platform
to measure the time overhead. The simulation environment
is Ubuntu OS over an Inter Pentium 2.1 GHz processor. We
choose type A curve in the Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC)
library – y2 = x3 + x, to complete the simulation. Here, we
assume that n participants try to upload their health data in a
certain time slot T.
Next, we view aggregation as the integration of aggregation
and aggregate verification. Then, we record the start time
from the beginning of the signing stage to simulate these
schemes. Therefore, we can obtain the time overhead of
different schemes as shown in Fig. 5. Compared with the
schemes in [23], [24], [36], the proposed scheme can save
50%, 42.1%, 39% running time respectively.
B. Storage Overhead
In the proposed scheme, the Data Center (DC) needs to store
all collected authentication information of different partici-
pants continuously until batch verification is done. Meanwhile,
as the aggregator, DC can, in real time, merge the collected
authentication information into a single verification message,
due to the advantage of the equation (16). When time T
8TABLE II: COMPLEXITY COMPARISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT SCHEMES
Scheme Signing Verification Aggregation Aggregate Verification
THH 4nH+3nS 5nH+4nP+2nS 0 4P+2nS
Malhi-Batra nH+4nS 2nH+3nP+3nS 0 3P+3nS
XGCL nH+3nS 2nH+3nP+2nS 0 3P+2nS
Ours nH+2nS 2nH+2nP+nS 2nS 2P
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Fig. 5: Comparison of time consumption between different schemes
is up, DC can verify these data in batch. Therefore, the
storage overhead of the proposed scheme can be reduced
differently according to the number of MHCS participants.
For quantitative analysis, we adopt the type A curve with base
field size of 512 bits, the cyclic group order of 160 bits, and
the embedding degree 2. So, Ui = 512 bits, Vi = 512 bits,
and SN ′i = 160 bits. Here, we assume that the size of health
data mi is 160 bits as [37].
As mentioned before, the verification information of the
participant i is 〈Ui, Vi,mi, SN
′
i〉. Therefore, the correspond-
ing storage overhead of the authentication data is SOi =
512 + 512 + 160 + 160 = 1344 bits. Here, SOi denotes
the storage overhead of the participant i. When the time T
is up, the total storage overhead of the n participants in this
time slot is SO = 512 + 512 + 160n+ 160 = 160n+ 1184
bits. Otherwise, if the verification stage does not utilize the
scheme in the batch mode, the total storage overhead of the n
participants is SO′ = 1344n bits. For better demonstration, we
depict the storage overhead on the aforementioned two cases
in Fig. 6. Then, we can conclude that the storage overhead is
greatly reduced in the batch mode.
For all above, the proposed scheme achieves a better perfor-
mance in terms of computation overhead and storage overhead.
It is efficient and suitable for mobile healthcare crowd sensing.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, based on an improved CL-AS algorithm, we
design an anonymous batch verification scheme for large-scale
concurrent data in MHCS scenarios. It meets the EUF-CMA
security in the random oracle model based on the intractability
of the CDHP. And it can achieve three properties including
batch authentication, non-repudiation, and anonymity. More-
over, our scheme can be deployed in MHCS system to offer
batch health data authentication and privacy preservation si-
multaneously. Through quantitative performance analysis, we
find that the proposed scheme achieves lower computation
overhead and provides better efficiency compared with the
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Fig. 6: The storage overhead of our scheme
existing schemes, and its storage overhead is also reduced
greatly. The proposed scheme is an efficient solution for the
MHCS systems.
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